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BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCES-PAYMENT TO JUDGMENT CREDITOR
PURSUANT TO AN INCOME EXECUTION SERVED BEFORE THE

NINETY-DAY PERIOD IS NOT AN AVOIDABLE PREFERENCE.

Riddervold v. Saratoga Hospital (In re Riddervold) (2d Cir. 1981).
On December 3, 1979, David B. and Susan R. Riddervold filed
voluntary petitions in bankruptcy 1 seeking relief under Chapter 7 2 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Code).3 Within the ninety days prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petitions, 4 approximately $227 had been
deducted from David Riddervold's wages and paid to his creditorthe Saratoga Hospital.5 The deduction and payment to the hospital
1. Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp. (In re Riddervold), 647 F.2d 342, 343
(2d Cir. 1981). It is not clear whether the petitions filed by David and Susan
Riddervold were separate or joint petitions. Id. If separate petitions were
filed, it appears that they were consolidated under Bankruptcy Rule 13-111(b)
for ease of administration, as only a single trustee was appointed. See 11
U.S.C. App. RULE 13-111(b) (1976).
2. 647 F.2d at 343. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1979). Chapter 7
provides for liquidation of the debtor's estate, while preserving certain property of the debtor as exempt. See id. §§ 701-766 (Supp. III 1979). Under
Chapter 7, a voluntary case is commenced by the filing of a petition which
constitutes an "order for relief" under the Code. See id. § 301. An involuntary case may be similarly commenced in certain circumstances, See id.
§ 303. An interim trustee is appointed promptly by the court. If no trustee
is elected by the creditors, the interim trustee serves as trustee. See id. § 702.
The trustee's primary duty is to collect and distribute the property of the
estate. See id. § 704(1). Property of the estate includes various interests which
the debtor had, has, or will have in property, reduced by any property which
is properly exempted by the debtor. See id. §§ 522, 541. Following a meeting
of creditors, the trustee liquidates the debtor's estate and distributes it to
creditors in accordance with the priority of their claims. See id. §§ 341, 701,
726.
3. 647 F.2d at 343. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1979). Title I
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified and enacted as title 11 of
the United States Code. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Titles II and III of the 1978 Act make
amendments to title 28 of the United States Code, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and numerous other Acts. Id. §§ 201-338, 92 Stat. 2657-82. Title IV
creates a transition period from October 1, 1979 to April 1, 1984, to allow the
new court structure created by the 1978 Act to be developed, and controls
certain procedures during the transition period. See id. §§ 401-411, 92 Stat.
2682-88. See generally 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 88 (1980).
4. 647 F.2d at 344. The 90-day period preceding the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy is critical under the Code's preference provisions. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1979). Any transfer of the debtor's property made
within this period to a creditor may be avoided and be subject to recall into
the debtor's estate if certain conditions are met. See generally id. § 547(b).
For a discussion of the Code's preference section, see notes 28-41 and accompanying text infra.
5. 647 F.2d at 344. There was some confusion as to the amount of money
in controversy. See id. at 344 n.l. This figure comes from Riddervold's brief
on appeal.

Id.

(1286)
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were made in accordance with an income execution permitted under
New York law.6 The execution was served upon Riddervold's employer
eleven months prior to the date the Riddervolds filed their bankruptcy
On January 5, 1980, the Riddervolds filed a complaint 8
petitions.1
against, inter alia, the Saratoga Hospital 9 seeking to recover the money
as an avoidable preference 10 under section 547(b) of the Code." The
6. Id. at 344. Income execution is a method of post-judgment garnishment
of a debtor's wages governed in New York by § 5231 of the New York Civil
Practice Laws and Rules. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5231 (McKinney 1978). For
a discussion of income execution in New York under § 5231 and its statutory
predecessors, see note 49 infra.
7. 647 F.2d at 345. The hospital obtained a judgment against David
Riddervold in a New York state court on March 17, 1977, in the amount of
$1,410.50 for unpaid medical bills arising from services rendered to Susan
Riddervold. Id. at 344. The judgment was recorded in the office of the
Saratoga County clerk. Id. An income execution based on the judgment
was issued under § 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules against
Riddervold's employer, the State of New York, on January 17, 1978. Id.
The Riddervold court assumed that the actual service on the employer occurred long before the 90 days prior to the Riddervold's filing of a bankruptcy
petition on December 3, 1979. Id. at 345.
8. Id. at 343. The complaint alleged two causes of action. Id. The
first cause of action sought to avoid certain judicial liens to the extent that
those liens impaired the Riddervold's equity in their residence which was
claimed as exempt property in the petition. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(1), (f)
(Supp. III 1979). The second cause of action, filed on behalf of David
Riddervold only, is the issue considered in this case. 647 F.2d at 343. See
note 9 infra.
9. 647 F.2d at 343. The cause of action against the hospital asserted that
1) between September 3, and December 3, 1979, the hospital caused monies to
be deducted from David Riddervold's wages pursuant to an income execution
served upon his employer; 2) that such monies constituted preferences which
the trustee in bankruptcy could have avoided; 3) that if the trustee had
avoided these payments, Riddervold could have exempted them under
§ 522(d)(5); and 4) that the trustee had not attempted and would not attempt
to recover the alleged preferences. Id. Riddervold contended that because
the trustee had not and would not initiate proceedings to that end, he (Riddervold) was entitled to do so under § 522(h). Id. at 344. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(h)
(Supp. III 1979).
In its answer, the hospital asked that this cause of action be dismissed.
647 F.2d at 343. The hospital alleged: 1) that the income execution constitutes a judicial lien fixed on January 17, 1978, the date on which it was
served on the employer; 2) that the lien was filed prior to the 90-day period
F receding the debtor's filing of the petition in bankruptcy; and, 3) that, thereore, the payments made to the hospital were made pursuant to the operation
of that judicial lien, and as such are not avoidable as preferences under
§ 547(b). Answer of the Saratoga Hospital, Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp. (In
re Riddervold), No. 79-10133 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1980).
10. A preference is a transfer of the property of the debtor to a creditor
within a short time prior to bankruptcy which enables that creditor to receive
payment of a greater percentage of his claim against the debtor than other
creditors similarly situated at the time of the bankruptcy. See generally 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. III 1979). For a more complete discussion of the
preference section of the Code, see notes 28-41 and accompanying text infra.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547. For a discussion of § 547, the preference section of
the Code, see notes 28-41 and accompanying text infra.
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Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York issued an
order 12 dismissing Riddervold's claim for recovery of the money, holding that the payments made to the hospital were merely enforcing a
judicial lien and levy which had been created prior to the ninety-day
period, and, therefore, were not subject to avoidance as preferences.' 3
On direct appeal by agreement of the parties, 14 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order, holding that payments made within the ninety-day period prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy pursuant to an income execution filed prior to that
period did not constitute transfer of the property of the debtor
avoidable under section 547(b) of the Code. Riddervold v. Saratoga
Hospital (In re Riddervold), 647 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1981).
In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States to study and recommend changes in the bankruptcy
law,' 5 thereby initiating a process which culminated in the enactment of
the Code. 16 One of the major purposes of the Code was to provide
adequate relief for individual debtors '7 by providing the debtor with
"adequate exemptions and other protections to ensure that bankruptcy
will provide a fresh start." 18 Accordingly, the law governing the
12. Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp. (In re Riddervold), No. 79-10133 slip
op. at 3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1980).
13. Id. The court concluded that the transfer of property of the debtor
took place on January 17, 1978 when the income execution was effective
against Riddervold's employer, nearly a year before the debtor filed his petition
in bankruptcy. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
14. 647 F.2d at 343. This appeal was made directly to the court of
appeals by agreement of the parties as provided in § 405(c)(1) of the 1978 Act.
Id. at 344. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(c)(1),

92 Stat. 2685 (1978). This provision of the Code controls direct appeals during
the transition period. See id. § 402, 92 Stat. 2682. The parties incorrectly
asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) which does not take effect until
April 1, 1984. See 647 F.2d at 343-44. See also note 78 infra.

15. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 5964 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595].
The nine-member commission was established by Act of July 24, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).

16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 101-1330, 92
Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1979)) (effective
October 1, 1979).

See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 5.

The major

purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was to modernize bankruptcy
law. Id. at 3. Both the substantive law of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
system which preceded the Code was governed by the Bankruptcy Act of July
1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976))

(repealed 1978) and was most recently amended in 1938 by the Chandler Act
of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938).
17. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 4. For a discussion of the purposes and policies underlying the Code's preference section, see note 18 infra.
18. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 118. The primary goals of the
Code's preference section may be stated as follows:
The purpose of the preference section is twofold. First, by permitting
the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a
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avoidance of preferential transfers of the debtor's property was substantially revised.' 9
Prior to the Code's enactment, avoidance of preferential transfers
20
by section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (prior Act).
governed
was
In addition, section 67 of the prior Act 2' allowed the trustee to avoid
short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing
to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy. Second, and more important, the preference provisions
facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater
payment than others of his class is required to disgorge so that all
may share equally.
Id. at 177-78. See also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, pt. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 201
(1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS].
A third purpose of the preference section and of the bankruptcy law in
general was noted by the Supreme Court in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry.
Co. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913). The Court determined that §67(f) of the
prior Act operated to void liens against both exempt and nonexempt property,
commenting:
This view, we think, is supported both by the language of the
section and the general policy of the act which was intended not only
to secure equality among creditors, but for the benefit of the debtor
in discharging him from his liabilities and enabling him to start
afresh with the property set apart to him as exempt.
229 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15,
at 117-18.
19. For a discussion of the specific revisions made by the Code, see notes
30-32 & 39-41 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the law of
preferential transfers prior to the Code, see notes 20-27 and accompanying text
infra.
20. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 562 (1898)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §96 (1976)) (repealed 1978). See H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 15, at 177. See also Teofan and Creel, The Trustee's Avoiding
Powers Under the Bankruptcy Act and the New Code: A Comparative
Analysis, 85 CoM. L.J. 542, 553 (1980).
21. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 564 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)) (repealed 1978). In pertinent part, § 67 provided as
follows:
a. (1) Every lien against the property of a person obtained by
attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or
proceedings within four months before the filing of a petition
initiating a proceeding under this title by or against such person
shall be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was
obtained such person was insolvent or (b) if such lien was sought
and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this title: Provided, however, That if such person is not finally adjudged a bankrupt in any
proceeding under this title and if no arrangement or plan is proposed
and confirmed, such lien shall be deemed reinstated with the same
effect as if it has not been nullified and voided.
(3) The property affected by any lien deemed null and Void
under the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision a
shall be discharged from such lien, and such property and any of the
indemnifying property transferred to or for the benefit of a surety
shall pass to the trustee or debtor, as the case may be, except that

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/7

4

Binder: Bankruptcy - Preferences - Payment to Judgment Creditor Pursuant

1290

[VOL.

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

27: p. 1286

certain liens 22 obtained against the property of the debtor during the
critical period prior to bankruptcy, 2 and to recall into the bankrupt's
estate any property transferred in satisfaction of such liens.2 4
Under
the prior Act, transfers of the debtor's property made to a creditor pursuant to an income execution were more easily avoided by the trustee
under provisions of section 67 rather than section 60.25 As a result, the
case law generated under the prior Act regarding such transfers is
couched in
erences.2 6

terms of lien avoidance

rather

than avoidance

of pref-

Because of changes introduced by the Code, judicial liens

obtained within ninety days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition
which were previously voidable under section 67a of the prior Act, are
27
now voidable as preferences under section 547 of the Code.
the court may on due notice order any such lien to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate, and the court may direct such conveyance
as may be proper or adequate to evidence the title thereto of the
trustee or debtor, as the case may be: Provided, however, That the
title of a bona fide purchaser of such property shall be valid, but if
such title is acquired otherwise than at a judicial sale held to enforce
such lien, it shall be valid only to the extent of the present consideration paid for such property.
Id.
For a discussion of the operation of §67a under the prior Act, see
Teofan and Creel, supra note 20, at 553.
22. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 564 (codified at
Under § 67a(l) of the prior Act the
trustee could avoid liens obtained against the bankrupt's property by legal
or equitable process such as attachment, garnishment, or levy of execution, and,
under § 67a(3) of the prior Act, the trustee could recover any property transferred on account of such liens. See Teofan and Creel, supra note 20, at 553.
For the text of § 67a, see note 21 supra.

11 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)) (repealed 1978).

23. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67, 30 Stat. 564 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)) (repealed 1978). The "critical period" under the prior
Act was the four-month period preceding the filing of the bankrupt's petition.
Id. Based on a recommendation by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States that the period be reduced, the Code shortened the
"critical period" to only 90 days. REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note
18, at 201. For a discussion of the critical period under the Code, see note 4
supra.
24. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67a(3), 30 Stat. 564 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 107a(3) (1976)) (repealed 1978).
25. See Teofan and Creel, supra note 20. This was true because the
preference section of the prior Act, §60, required the trustee to prove that
the creditor receiving the transfer had "reasonable cause to believe" that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Id. at 549-50. A lien obtained under an income execution is a "lien obtained by legal process," and
therefore fell within the operation of § 67a of the prior Act. See notes 21-22
supra. While the effect under § 60 of the prior Act would have been identical,
§ 67 provided a more attractive tool for the trustee because it had no "reasonable cause to believe" requirement, a requirement which was next to impossible
to prove. See Teofan and Creel, supra note 20, at 549-50.
26. See, e.g., In
1978).

re Tamari, 4 BANKR.

CT. DEC.

(CRR) 1028 (S.D.N.Y.

27. See Teofan and Creel, supra note 20, at 552.
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The Code, in section 547,28 contains a wholesale revision of preference law as it existed under the prior Act.2 The Code removes certain
obstacles which had limited the trustee's power to avoid preferential
transfers,3 0 and extends the power of avoidance to reach transfers of
exempt property of the debtor. 3 ' Further, the Code provides the debtor
with the right to exercise, on his own behalf, the avoidance powers of
the trustee under limited circumstances.3 2 Under section 547 of the
Code,3 3 in order to recover a payment toward an old, unsecured debt,
the trustee or the debtor must prove that there was a transfer of the
debtor's property, and that such transfer was: 1) to or for the benefit of
a creditor; 34 2) on account of an antecedent debt; 35 3) made within
ninety days prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy; 36 4) made
while the debtor was insolvent,37 and 5) a payment or transfer which
allowed the creditor to receive more than he would have received under
28. 11 U.S.C. §547 (Supp. III 1979).
29. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 18, at 201; H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 15, at 179.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 178. The Code no longer
requires the trustee to prove that the creditor receiving the transfer had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of
transfer. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §547(b) (Supp. III 1979). In addition, the Code
creates a presumption of the debtor's insolvency during the 90-day period preceding the filing of the petition. See id. § 547(f). See also Teofan and Creel,
supra note 20, at 550-51. For further discussion of preferential transfers under
the Code, see notes 33-41 and accompanying text infra.
31. REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 18, at 204. Under the prior
Act, as construed by the courts, only nonexempt property which would be distributed to creditors as part of the debtor's estate could be recovered under
the preference section. Id. The Code is clearly intended to eradicate this
distinction between exempt and nonexempt property for the purpose of
preferential recovery under §547. Id. See also Note, Avoidance of Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IowA L. REV.
209, 220 (1979).

32. 11 U.S.C. §522(h) (Supp. III 1979). If the trustee does not pursue
the power to avoid and recover a transfer of property that would be exempt,
the debtor may pursue it and exempt the property if the transfer was involuntary and the debtor did not conceal the property. H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 15, at 362. See also 9 AM.

33. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1978).

JUR. 2D

Bankruptcy § 319 (1980).

Subsection 547(b) is the operative provision

of this section. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5873. Section 547(b) authorizes the trustee
to avoid a transfer if five conditions are met. Id. For a discussion of these five

conditions, see notes 34-38 and accompanying text infra. See also Teofan and
Creel, supra note 20, at 549-52.
34. 11 U.S.C. §547(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
35. Id. § 547(b)(2).

36. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
37. Id. § 547(b)(3).

In connection with this condition, § 547(f) creates a

presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. See id. § 547(f).
supra.
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a Chapter 7 liquidation absent the transfer.88 The most significant
changes in the preference section are the creation of a presumption of
insolvency during the ninety-day critical period,39 and the removal of
the requirement that the creditor receiving the preference had "reasonable cause to believe" the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.40 In addition, section 547(e)(3) of the Code's preference section
specifies that "a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred." 41
Since the Code's enactment, there have been no cases which have
considered the effect of section 547 on payments made during the ninetyday period pursuant to an income execution under the New York
statute.4 2 However, several earlier cases have considered the nearly
identical issue of whether judicial liens obtained within the critical
period before bankruptcy were voidable under section 67a of the prior
Act.

43

38. 11 U.S.C. §547(b)(5) (Supp. III 1979). This provision contains the
mechanics of the "greater percentage test." Section 547(b)(5) in pertinent part
provides as follows:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
Id. The legislative history explains the operation of the test set forth in
§ 547(b)(5) as follows:
Under this language, the court must focus on the relative distribution
between classes as well as the amount that will be received by the
members of the class of which the preferee is a member. The language also requires the court to focus on the allowability of the claim
for which the preference was made. If the claim would have been
entirely disallowed, for example, then the test of paragraph (5) will
be met, because the creditor would have received nothing under the
distributive provisions of the bankruptcy code.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 373.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (Supp. III 1979). See notes 30 & 37 supra.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 595 supra note 15, at 178.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1978). For a discussion of the relevance of this
provision to the issue at hand, see notes 71-76, 118-124 and accompanying text
infra.
42. Several cases have examined the effect of § 547 on similar or analogous
situations. See, e.g., In re Emery, 13 Bankr. 689 (D. Vt. 1981); In re Diversified
World Invs., Ltd., 12 Bankr. 517 (S.D. Tex. 1981); In re Brengle, 10 Bankr.
360 (D. Del. 1981); In re Woodman, 8 Bankr. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1981); In re Cox,
7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 733 (D. Md. 1981).
43. See, e.g., In re Tamari, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
In re Parten, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 402 (N.D. Ala. 1977); In re Duffy, 34
F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); In re Smith, 8 F. Supp. 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1934);
In re Prunotto, 51 F.2d 602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Wodzicki, 238 F. 571
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Generally, under section 67a of the prior Act courts faced with the
question of whether a transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor
made within the critical period preceding bankruptcy pursuant to an
income execution served outside the period was avoidable, have found
the critical issue to be when the levy enforcing the income execution
attached to the debtor's wages. 44 Several courts have rendered their
decisions in accordance with their perceptions as to how the purposes
and policies underlying the bankruptcy law would best be served. 45 At
least one court has confronted and rejected the novel argument that
when a garnishing creditor obtains a judgment directly against the
garnishee, a novation results, thereby completely extinguishing the
46
debtor's rights to the garnished funds.
(S.D.N.Y. 1916); In re Beck, 238 F. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Sims, 176 F. 645
(S.D.N.Y. 1910).
44. See, e.g., In re Tamari, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1028, 1029 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). In this regard the courts generally look to state law characterizing
installment payments under a wage garnishment because state law determines
the nature of the liens. See In re Marsters, 101 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1938).
The courts have taken two opposing views on the issue of when the levy is
obtained against the debtor's periodic wages. A majority of cases subscribe to
the view that the lien and levy are not obtained until the wages are earned
by the debtor. See, e.g., In re Tamari, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1028, 1029
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Parten, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 402, 405 (N.D. Ala.
1977); In re Beck, 238 F. 653, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
Several courts have held that the lien and levy on all wages earned after
the income execution is served upon the garnishee relates back to the original
date of levy. See, e.g., In re Sims, 176 F. 645, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
45. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511,
515 (1912) (general policy of bankruptcy law requires that § 67(f) of the prior
Act apply to both exempt and non-exempt property of bankrupt); In re Parten,
3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 402, 404 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (the various provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act are to be construed when reasonably possible so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy of the Act; local rules subversive of
that result cannot be accepted as controlling the action of federal courts);
In re Wodzicki, 238 F. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (to allow the injunction to
stand would permit a result not contemplated by the act). In re Sims, 176
F. 645, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (to allow creditors to levy on wages earned after
adjudication would violate the purpose of the prior act).
46. See In re Ransford, 194 F. 658 (6th Cir. 1912). In Ransford, a
creditor garnished the bank account of a corporation and acquired a judgment
against the corporation for $568.85. Two days later the creditor obtained a
judgment against the garnishee bank for the same amount. Within four
months of the initial judgment, the debtor corporation was adjudicated a
bankrupt, and the rights to the garnished funds were disputed by the judgment
creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy.
The district court awarded the money to the trustee and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 660. In response to the creditor's argument that by "statutory"
novation he was substituted as the bank's creditor to the exclusion of the
bankrupt debtor, the court stated:
[S]uffice it to say that under state law it is not the rendition of the
garnishee judgment that extinguishes the old debt . . . and absolutely

absolves the garnishee from liability to [the debtor] to the extent of
the judgment, but payment of the judgment by the garnishee. ...

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/7

8

Binder: Bankruptcy - Preferences - Payment to Judgment Creditor Pursuant

1294

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 1286

The first case to consider the question in the context of the New
York income execution statute was In re Sims. 4 7 In Sims, a creditor
sought to vacate a stay operating against the bankrupt's creditors.48
The stay prevented the creditor from collecting money withheld from
the bankrupt's salary pursuant to an income execution served upon the
bankrupt's employer in accordance with New York law. 49 In an opinion
If payment is not made by him, the old debt still subsists as an
enforceable claim.
Id. at 662-63. The court pointed out that the bankrupt debtor may restore his
legal right to the money held by the garnishee by satisfying his debt to the
judgment creditor. Id. at 663. The court reasoned that if garnishment on
judgment operates as a satisfaction of the debt against the bankrupt debtor,
then regardless of whether the garnishee pays the obligation, the original
debtor is absolved from liability on the debt. Id. The court refused to create
such a "snare to entrap the creditor." Id.
47. 176 F. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). The bankrupt filed his petition in bankruptcy on December 20, 1909. Id. at 646. Based on a judgment obtained eleven
years earlier, the creditor obtained an income execution against the bankrupt
on October 7, 1908. Id. Pursuant to the execution, the employer paid $30.76
to the creditor, and, thereafter, the sheriff collected and retained for the
benefit of the creditor an additional $139.42, a portion of which represented
money earned by the bankrupt and collected by the sheriff during the four
months prior to the filing of the petition. Id. A trustee had been appointed.
Id.
48. Id. at 646. The filing of a petition, under both the prior Act and the
Code, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of the commencement or
continuation of judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the
debtor, where the proceeding was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, or where the proceeding is one to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See generally 9
AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 458 (1980). A complimentary provision allows a
creditor to petition the court to vacate the stay as it pertains to that creditor
under certain circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. III 1979). See also 9
AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 477 (1980).
49. 176 F. at 646. The statute governing income execution in New York
at this time was § 1391 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1876.
Section 1391 provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Said execution shall become a lien and a continuing levy upon the
wages, earnings, debts, salary, income from trust funds or profits, due
or to become due to said judgment debtor to the amount specified
therein which shall not exceed ten per centum thereof, and said levy
shall be a continuing levy until said execution and the expenses
thereof are fully satisfied and paid or until modified as hereinafter
provided.
Id.
This language was continued in § 1391's successor statute, § 684 of the
New York Civil Practice Act of 1920, but does not appear in the current New
York income execution statute, §5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules. The present statute provides in pertinent part:
(d) If a judgment debtor fails to pay installments pursuant to an
income execution . . . the sheriff shall levy upon the money that the

judgment debtor is receiving or will receive by serving a copy of the
income execution, indorsed to indicate the extent to which paid
installments have satisfied the judgment, upon the person from whom
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authored by Judge Learned Hand, the court vacated the stay as to that
portion of the bankrupt's salary which fell due prior to the filing of the
petition, holding that the lien had attached prior to the critical period,
on the basis that "the levy . . . was more than four months old when

the petition was filed, and under the New York Code the execution
operates as a 'continuing levy' till the judgment is paid." r0

Five years later, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in deciding In re Beck 51 was faced with almost
identical factual circumstances.5 2 Without reference to Sims, 53 the court
held that the lien attached during the critical period, stating that "there
could be no levy upon [the debtor's] salary until there was a salary to
levy upon. Therefore, the date of levy is coincident with the date of
accruing wage ....

.,54

The court concluded that the trustee was en-

the judgment debtor is receiving or will receive money personally
within the county in the same manner as a summons ...

(e) A person served with an income execution shall withhold from
money then or thereafter due to the judgment debtor installments of

ten percent thereof and pay them over to the sheriff. If such person
shall fail to so pay the sheriff, the judgment creditor may commence

a proceeding against him for accrued installments. If the money due
to the judgment debtor consists of salary or wages and his employ-

ment is terminated by resignation or dismissal at any time after

service of the execution, the levy shall thereafter be ineffective, and
the execution shall be returned, unless the debtor is reinstated or
reemployed within ninety days after such termination.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5231 (McKinney 1978).
50. 176 F. at 646. This holding relied directly upon the language of
§ 1391 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1876 which provides for
a "continuing levy." Id. See note 49 supra. The idea implicit in this holding is that the lien and levy on all wages earned after the income execution is
served upon the garnishee relates back to the original date of service under
the "continuing levy" theory. See In re Wodzicki, 238 F. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
No mention of a "continuing levy" is contained in the current version of the
income execution statute. See generally N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5231 (McKinney

1978).

For a discussion of New York Code of Civil Procedure § 1391 and its

successors, see note 49 supra.
51. 238 F. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
52. Id. The bankrupt filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on February 16, 1915. Id. at 654. Based on a judgment obtained against the
bankrupt on October 6, 1913, an income execution was issued under § 1391
of the New York Code of Civil Procedure shortly after October 21, 1913,
when an ordinary execution was returned unsatisfied. Id. For a discussion
of the income execution statutes in New York, see note 49 supra. Thereafter,
the city paymaster retained a portion of the bankrupt's wages until he had in
hand $101.34 at the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 238 F. at
653. As in Sims, the case came before the court on motion by the creditor to
vacate or modify an order staying proceedings in the state court affecting the
bankruptcy. Compare id. at 653 with In re Sims, 176 F. at 646. A trustee in
bankruptcy had been appointed. 238 F. at 654.
53. 238 F. at 653-54.
54. 238 F. at 654. This theory has been widely accepted since the Beck
case was decided. See 4 COLIuER ON BANKRUPTCY
67.10 n.4 (14th ed. 1967).
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titled to the salary withheld during the critical period prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. 55
This same court once again examined the question in In re
Wodzicki 56 and considered the conflicting authority presented by Sims
and Beck. Judge Mayer, writing for the court, acknowledged that "the
question is a close one" 57 and discussed the Sims rationale at length in
dicta. The court interpreted the Sims theory to be that "the levy,
throughout its continuance, was as of its original date." 58 Furthermore,
the court recognized that some support for this theory existed in the
provision of the statute that permitted only one execution to be in operation at one time against a particular debtor.59 These statements,
however, were merely dicta, as the court carefully stressed the fact that
no trustee had been appointed, 60 and held that only the trustee in bankruptcy has a right to oppose the creditor's claim to the money withheld,
61
thus avoiding a resolution of the Sims-Beck controversy.
55. 238 F. at 654. The court first noted that the trustee clearly has no
claim to money withheld prior to the critical period preceding bankruptcy. Id.
As to the issue of the rights of the parties to money withheld within the
critical period, Judge Hough based his holding on Clarke v. Larremore, 188
U.S. 486 (1903). See 238 F. at 654. However, Clarke did not involve an
income execution, and the judgment, execution and levy on the bankrupt's
property took place within the critical 4-month period. 188 U.S. at 486. The
Supreme Court in Clarke held that where a sheriff holds money after selling
the bankrupt's property on execution and has not paid it over to the judgment
creditor prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the money passes to
the trustee in bankruptcy under § 67 of the prior Act. Id. at 488. This
holding was based upon the fact that the writ of execution had not been
fully executed by payment to the judgment creditor. Id. The Court qualified
its holding, stating:
A different question might have arisen if the writ had been fully
executed by payment to the execution creditor. Whether the bankruptcy proceedings would then so far affect the judgment and
execution, and that which was done under them, as to justify a recovery by the trustee in bankruptcy from the execution creditor, is
a question not before us, and may depend on many other considerations.
Id. at 490.
56. 238 F. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). But for a difference in actual dates, the
fact situation in Wodzicki is identical to those in Sims and Beck, except that
a trustee had not yet been appointed in Wodzicki. Compare id. at 571 with
In re Sims, 176 F. at 646 and In re Beck, 238 F. at 653.
57. Id. at 572. However, the court acknowledged that the creditor was
clearly entitled to money withheld prior to the 4-month period preceding
bankruptcy, and ordered the stay modified accordingly. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See N.Y.C. Civ. P. § 1391 (1876) (repealed 1920).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 573. The court did suggest that to allow the debtor to recover
the money withheld during the 4-month period would be contrary to the
objects of the bankruptcy statute because "the judgment creditor would be
deprived of the fruits of his diligence." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 6 [1982], Art. 7

1981-82]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1297

The question of when the levy attaches to the bankrupt's wages
under an income execution was once again considered in In re Prunotto.62 Although not resolving the issue, 63 the court expressed a preference for the view first expressed in Beck, 64 that under an income execution, the lien and levy do not attach to wages until the wages are
earned. 65
In re Tamari,6 6 a more recent decision in this area, gave careful
consideration to the operation and effect of the New York income execution statute-section 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules.6 T The Tamari court relied upon Beck as representative of the
prevailing view that a lien of garnishment is an installment levy which
62. 51 F.2d 602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931).
63. Id. The primary issue in In re Prunotto was whether the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to stay the operation of an income execution against
wages earned after adjudication in bankruptcy. Id. at 603. The creditor
argued that the service of the income execution created a valid and continuing
lien and levy on all future wages of the bankrupt, and that where, as here,
the income execution was first served more than 4 months prior to bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court was without authority to restrain its operation
against the debtor's future wages. Id. The Prunotto court held that the
debtor's wages earned after adjudication in bankruptcy were protected by the
debtor's discharge and therefore were not subject to the income execution. Id.
64. Id. The income execution statute in effect when Prunotto was decided
was § 684 of the New York Civil Practice Act of 1920. Beck was decided under
its predecessor-§ 1391 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure. The language of § 684 of the Civil Practice Act is nearly identical to that of § 1391 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. For a comparative discussion of these statutes,
see note 49 supra.
65. 51 F.2d at 603. The court relied upon Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U.S.
486 (1903), noting that in Clarke, as in Prunotto, the lien was created within
the critical period. For a discussion of Clarke v. Larremore, see note 55 supra.
66. 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Tamari, the
debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on February 3, 1978. Id. at
1028. More than four months before that date, a creditor had obtained a
judgment against the debtor and an income execution had been issued under
§ 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules against the debtor's
wages. Id. Installment payments were made to the creditor, totaling $186.19,
during the 4-month period prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Id. The trustee sought to recover the money paid during that period, claiming
that the money constituted property of the estate, and that the payments were
made under a lien of garnishment which had attached during the 4-month
critical period. Id.
67. Id. at 1029. For the text of § 5231 and a discussion of its predecessors,
see note 49 supra. The Tamari court referred to Ulner v. Doran, 167 A.D.
259, 152 N.Y.S. 655 (1915), which construed the language of § 1391 of the New
York Code of Civil Procedure. This section is the predecessor to New York's
current income execution statute, § 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law

and Rules. 4

BANKR. CT. DEC.

(CRR) at 1029. Based on the assumption that

the effect of each statute was the same, the court in Tamari reasoned:
In Ulner v. Doran the court stated that the purpose of the statute was
"to avoid the necessity of successive levies from time to time whenever
an installment of income might become due. It certainly was not
intended to create a specific lien upon income or earnings not yet
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attaches only when the payment is deducted from the debtor's wages,6 8
and held that the trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to recover the
money representing payments withheld during the critical period preceding bankruptcy.6 9
The aforegoing cases were decided prior to the revisions introduced
by section 547 of the Code.7 0 Under the Code, the critical issue is when
the transfer occurred, rather than when the lien attached.7 1 Among
other changes, section 547(e)(3) provides that, for purposes of the Code's
preference section, a transfer "is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights to the property transferred." 72 This provision was specifically
added to prevent the transfer date of a security interest in after-acquired
property from relating back to when the security agreement was executed and the financing statement filed.7 3 Nonetheless, its application
due." Thus, a garnishment is an installment levy which is executed
each time a payment is taken out of the debtor's paycheck.
Id. (citation omitted).
It should be noted that the court in Tamari disregarded that portion of
the Ulner opinion which dealt with the effect of bankruptcy proceedings upon
payments made to a judgment creditor pursuant to an income execution. The
Ulner court said that "We think, however, that the execution remained valid
and enforceable until modified as contemplated by section 1391 ...and that
any moneys collected under it, even after the date of the defendant's discharge
in bankruptcy, are properly payable to the judgment creditor." Ulner v.
Doran, 167 A.D. 259, 262, 152 N.Y.S. 655, 658 (1915) (emphasis added). However, this portion of the Ulner opinion has been seriously questioned. See,
e.g., Friedman v. Gibbons, 101 Misc. 356, 359, 167 N.Y.S. 685, 687 (Sup. Ct.
1917).
68. 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 1029. The court in Tamari quoted Beck
at length, and stated that "[m]ore than six decades have not diminished the
continuing vitality of the case nor have changing standards diminished its
wisdom and pragmatism." Id.
The Tamari court also relied on 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
67.10 at n.4
(14th ed. 1967). This treatise states the rule as follows:
Where, however, garnishment issued anterior to the four-month period
reaches income . . . becoming due and payable within the period, the

lien is generally viewed as arising no earlier than the acquisition by
the debtor of the right to payment ....
Id. Both Beck and Prunotto are cited by Collier in support of the above
proposition, and both Sims and Wodzicki are cited contra. Id.
69. 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. at 1029.
70. See note 16 supra.
71. See In re Cox, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 733, 735 (D. Md. 1981). See
also note 120 and accompanying text infra.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 374. Section 547(e)(3) was
specifically intended to overrule Grain Merchants v. Union Savings Bank, 408
F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). See H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 15, at 374.
In Grain Merchants, a bank received a security interest in accounts receivable as collateral for a loan. 408 F.2d at 209. The court was faced with

the issue of to whom money deposited in those accounts during the preference
period belonged. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the transfer took place
when the security interest in the accounts receivable was perfected, i.e., at the
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is not expressly limited to such circumstances, and a number of courts
have applied section 547(e)(3) to wage garnishments and analogous
74
situations.
For example, in In re Cox,75 a case decided by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, the court relied on section
76
The Cox court applied
547(e)(3) of the Code to support its holding.
section 547(e)(3) to the wage garnishment situation, and concluded that
the transfer of garnished wages took place when the wages were earned
by the debtorj 7 Therefore, the Cox court held that payments made to

time of execution and filing, and not when the debtor received the money in
Id. at 213.
74. See II U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). Several recent cases have
applied § 547(e)(3) to wage garnishments and analogous circumstances for the
purpose of determining whether the transfer of the debtor's property took
place within the 90-day critical period. See, e.g., In re Emery, 13 Bankr. 689,
690 (D. Vt. 1981) (under § 547(e)(3) a transfer is not made until the debtor
acquires property rights by earning wages); In re Diversified World Investments, Ltd., 12 Bankr. 517, 519 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (§ 547(e)(3) applies to payments made under an assignment of rental payments to determine when transfer took place); In re Brengle, 10 Bankr. 360, 361 (D. Del. 1981) (where wages
earned by debtor are transferred to creditor pursuant to garnishment at the
time of transfer is when the debtor acquires rights in wages by earning them).
But see In re Woodman, 8 Bankr. 686, 688 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (where wages
earned prior to garnishment, and employee/debtor fails to challenge garnishment, the transfer of property of the debtor is complete-later transfers from
garnishee to creditor do not involve "property of the debtor").
In In re Diversified World Investments, Ltd., the court compared the
instant case to Grain Merchants and Cox in applying § 547 to an assignment
of rental payments to a creditor by a bankrupt debtor. 12 Bankr. at 519. The
assignment was made outside of the 90-day critical period preceding bankruptcy, but the rental payments became due and were actually paid during
that 90-day period. Id. at 518. The assignee/creditor argued that an assignment of the right to payment is complete when made, and that payments
made pursuant to the assignment are not transfers of the property of the
debtor. Id. at 519. The court disagreed, and, reading § 547(e)(3) together
with the Code's broad definition of "transfer," argued that rental payments
from the lessee to the creditor were indirect transfers made for the debtor's
benefit. Id. The court concluded:
The lease'that generated the payments to [the creditor] was between [the debtor] and [the lessee]. Had the lease been terminated
for any reason [the creditor] would not have been entitled to receive
the rental payments. . . The debtor did not acquire any rights to
the rentals except as they became due from [the lessee]. Thus, under
§ 547(e)(3) the transfer was not made until such time as the rents
accrued under the terms of the lease.
Id.
75. 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 733 (D. Md. 1981). In Cox, the judgment
creditor received funds under the wage garnishment sufficient to fully satisfy
his judgment. Id. at 733. The operation of the Maryland wage garnishment
statute applied in Cox is indistinguishable from the New York income execution statute. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-601-15-606 (Supp. 1981).
76. 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 735. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III
1979). See also note 41 supra.
77. 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 735.
his account.
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the judgment creditor under the wage garnishment attributable to wages
earned during the ninety-day period constituted preferential payments
recoverable by the debtor under section 547.8
Against this background the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Friendly, considered the question of whether payments to a creditor
during the bankruptcy ninety-day critical period, 79 pursuant to an income execution served upon the debtor's employer prior to that critical
period, constituted avoidable preferences under section 547 of the
Code.80 The court initially recognized that the issue's resolution depends on applying section 547 to the action taken by the Hospital under
the New York income execution statute.8 ' Focusing on Code section
547(b),82 Judge Friendly outlined the circumstances under which section
547(b) allows the trustee to avoid a "transfer of the property of the
debtor," 83 and narrowed the issue by conceding that certain of those
84
circumstances were present in Riddervold.
78. Id.

79. For a brief discussion of the critical period under the Code, see note 4
supra.
80. 647 F.2d at 344.

For a discussion of § 547 of the Code, see notes 28-41

and accompanying text supra.
Initially, the court addressed the propriety of the court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 343. The parties relied upon § 1293(b) which was added to

title 28 of the United States Code by title II, § 236 of the 1978 Act, and
provides for direct appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals from "a final
judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court of the United States if the
parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals." Id.
See also Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title II, § 236, 92 Stat. 2667
(1978). As Judge Friendly noted, if § 1293(b) were presently effective, the
court would not have jurisdiction because the statute provides for a direct
appeal from a final order, while the order appealed from was an interlocutory
order as the first cause of action remained pending. 647 F.2d at 343-44. In
addition, the court noted, the bankruptcy judge had not certified the order as
proper for immediate appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
made applicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy by Bankruptcy Rule
754. Id. at 344. However, the amendment adding § 1293 to title 28 does not
become effective until April 1, 1984. Id. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, title IV, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). Until that time, § 405(C)(1)
of the 1978 Act controls such direct appeals, and § 405(C)(1) does not require
that the order appealed be a final order. 647 F.2d at 344. See Act of Nov. 6,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, § 405(C)(1), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978). Therefore,
the Riddervold court concluded that it had jurisdiction in this case under
§ 405(C)(1) of the 1978 Act. 647 F.2d at 344.
81. 647 F.2d at 344.
82. Id. For a discussion of §547(b), see notes 28-41 and accompanying
text supra.
83. 647 F.2d at 344.
84. Id. The court noted that there is a presumption of insolvency of the
debtor during the 90-day period preceding bankruptcy. Id. n.3. The court
also acknowledged that the requirements of the greater percentage test set
forth in § 547(b)(5) were met in this case. Id. at 344. For a discussion of
§ 547(b)(5), see note 28 supra.
Judge Friendly noted the right of the debtor to challenge the payments to
the hospital in this circumstance under § 522(h) of the Code. Id. at 345. For
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Turning then to the pre-Code cases which the court thought relevant to its analysis, s5 the court noted the conflict between the continuing
levy theory of In re Sims s 6 and the holding of In re Beck that the date
of the levy is coincident with the date of the accruing wage.8 7 The
court proceeded to comment unfavorably upon In re Beck, describing
the case's reliance upon Clarke v. Larremore 88 as "misplaced," and
noting the absence of a reference in Beck to Sims.89 Further, Judge
Friendly stated that the Beck decision had "scant appeal" 90 to the court
in In re Wodzicki, 91 noting that court's expression of approval for the
continuing levy theory.9 2 The Riddervold court interpreted Wodzicki
as confining In re Beck "to the decision that only the trustee and not
the bankrupt could obtain the money" 03 withheld under the income
execution, thereby upholding the rights of the judgment creditor.H
Finally, the court made quick reference to In re Prunotto95 as a case
which followed Sims only insofar as it "denied the validity of the execution against post-adjudication wages." 96
Following this survey of precedent, the court concluded that in
principle, the State's payment of $227 to the hospital during the ninety97
day period did not constitute a transfer of the property of the debtor.
a discussion of the debtor's right to avoid preferences not challenged by the
trustee, see note 32 supra. Judge Friendly commented that "it is not clear
why the 1978 Code extended the power to avoid preferences to bankrupts."
647 F.2d at 345 n.5.

85. 647 F.2d at 345. The relevant case law under the prior Act dealt
with § 67 lien avoidance as opposed to § 60 recovery of preferences. See notes
21-27 and accompanying text supra.
86. 647 F.2d at 346. For a discussion of In re Sims and the "continuing
levy" theory upon which it was decided, see notes 47-50 and accompanying
text supra.
87. 647 F.2d at 346. For a discussion of In re Beck, see notes 51-55 and
accompanying text supra.
88. 188 U.S. 486 (1903). For a discussion of Clarke v. Larremore, see
note 55 supra.
89. 647 F.2d at 346.
90. Id.

91. Id. For a discussion of In re Wodzicki, see notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
92. 647 F.2d at 346.
93. Id. In re Wodzicki was decided on this basis in reliance upon In re
Beck. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra. However, the Code now
vests the debtor with the trustee's avoidance power. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(h)
(Supp. 111 1979); note 32 supra.
94. 647 F.2d at 346.
95. Id. For a discussion of In re Prunotto, see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
96. 647 F.2d at 346.
97. Id. Judge Friendly noted that this is not because the debtor did not
voluntarily cause the payments, as he conceded that "transfer" under the
Code is defined to include involuntary transfers. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40)
(Supp. III 1979).
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In drawing this conclusion, the Riddervold court reasoned that the
debtor has no property interest in wages which are subject to an income
execution, because service of the income execution on the employer has
the effect of a novation such that the employer owes a portion of the
wages to the judgment creditor directly, rather than to the employee/
debtor. 98 Emphasizing the fact that the payments were made pursuant
to an income execution which has been served prior to the ninety-day
critical period, 99 Judge Friendly suggested that the court's decision followed the "continuing levy" principle announced by Judge Learned
Hand in In re Sims and adopted by Judge Mayer in In re Wodzicki
under the prior Act. 100 Recognizing that the cases on which it relied
were decided under the prior Act, the court justified its reliance upon
them by noting that nothing in the language or the policy of the 1978
Code precludes their continued application. 101
It is submitted that Judge Friendly's opinion in Riddervold represents a significant departure from both prior law and the new provisions
of the Code which is not justifiable in light of the applicable Code
provisions, 10 2 the policies of the Code as expressed in the legislative
98. 647 F.2d at 346. Judge Friendly relied upon the language of § 5231(e)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules which provides that the
garnishee becomes principally liable to the judgment creditor for accrued installments under the income execution, such that the judgment creditor has a
right to sue the garnishee for any unpaid installments. Id. For a discussion
of § 5231, see note 49 supra. Judge Friendly responded to the In re Beck
position in a footnote, stating simply "we prefer the reasoning of Judge L.
Hand [in Sims] and Mayer [in Wodzicki]." Id. n.7.
99. 647 F.2d at 347. While it is not clear, Judge Friendly seems to conclude that, at least so far as the judgment creditor vis-h-vis the debtor is concerned, the income execution is fully executed by the transfer of the debtor's
right to compensation for future earnings to the judgment creditor at the
time the income execution is served upon the garnishee. See note 100 infra.
100. 647 F.2d at 347. Judge Friendly further supported this position by
commenting that his decision conforms to the "intimations" of Clarke v.
Larremore that a bankruptcy does not affect the creditor's rights when a writ

of execution under a valid lien has been fully executed by payment to the

execution creditor. Id.

For a discussion of Clarke v. Larremore, see note 55

supra.
101. 647 F.2d at 347.
102. In this regard, it is submitted that § 522(h), which extends the power
to recover preferences to the debtor and permits the debtor to exempt the
property recovered, reveals a strong legislative interest in preserving the
debtor's exemptions to allow the debtor to make a fresh start following bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §522(h) (Supp. III 1979). This view is supported by
the position taken by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States regarding transfers of exempt property as subject to preferential recovery. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 18, at 204.
Section 522(h) of the Code represents a significant change in the bankruptcy law, a fact which Judge Friendly recognized in his opinion. See 647
F.2d at 345 n.5. However, Judge Friendly did not speculate as to the policy
behind this new provision in his opinion. Id. See also note 84 supra.
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history, 0 3 and prior cases.104 Two of the Code's fundamental policies,
those of equality of distribution among creditors and providing the
debtor with adequate exempt property with which to make a fresh start,
are thwarted by the Riddervold court's decision. 105 It is suggested that
these policies deserved greater recognition in the court's opinion, particularly in the absence of any articulated countervailing policies. 10
It is further submitted that the Riddervold court's reliance upon
the "continuing levy" theory of In re Sims 107 to determine when the
levy is effective against the debtor's earnings is strained. 108 First, a close
reading of In re Wodzicki 109 and In re Prunotto,110 two cases cited by
the Riddervold court as supporting Sims,"' reveals that neither case
actually addressed the issue of Sims." 2 Furthermore, a large majority
103. For a discussion of the policies behind the preference section of the
Code set forth in the legislative history, see note 18 supra.
104. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Hall, 229 U.S.
511 (1913); note 18 supra.
105. See note 20 supra. See also text following note 124 infra.
106. It has been said that any interpretation of the bankruptcy statute
should be made consistent with the express policies of the bankruptcy law
whenever possible. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
107. For a discussion of In re Sims, see notes 47-50 and accompanying text
supra. The Riddervold court relied upon Sims to determine when the levy
created by the income execution lien attaches to the debtor's future earnings,
and concluded that the levy attaches to all future earnings at the time the
execution is served upon the debtor's employer. See 647 F.2d at 347.
The lower court denied the preferential nature of the payments made to
the hospital during the 90-day period by reference to the "time of transfer"
test established by Code § 547(e)(3). Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp. (In re
Riddervold), No. 79-10133, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1980). The
Second Circuit, however, avoided a direct confrontation with the "time of
transfer" test in its analysis. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. Based
on its conclusion concerning the effective date of the income execution levy
against future wages, and by focusing only on the payments made to the
hospital, the Riddervold court resolved the issue by reference to the threshold
"transfer of the property of the debtor" requirement expressed in Code
section 547(b). Id.
108. See notes 109-17 and accompanying text infra. See also note 121 and
accompanying text infra.
109. 238 F. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). For a discussion of In re Wodzicki, see
notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
110. 51 F.2d 602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931). For a discussion of In re Prunotto,
see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
111. 647 F.2d at 346.
112. But see note 61 supra. To the extent that the dicta in Wodzicki
supports the policy argument behind the Sims decision, the validity of that
argument has been diminished by the bankruptcy law's growing policy interest
in preserving the debtor's exemptions. See note 18 supra.
It is true, as Judge Friendly notes, that Prunotto endorsed that portion
of the Sims decision which invalidates the income execution as to the debtor's
post-adjudication wages. 647 F.2d at 346. As to that point of law there has
never been a dispute. See In re Parten, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 402, 405
(N.D. Ala. 1977); In re Wodzicki, 238 F. at 571. Nonetheless, it is important
to note that in regard to that portion of the Sims opinion that bears directly
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of the courts which have considered the question, both under the prior
Act and the Code, have endorsed the In re Beck theory that "the date
of the levy is coincident with the date of accruing wage." 118
In addition, the theory of In re Beck conforms more closely with
the design of section 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules. 114 The purpose of this income execution statute was "to avoid
the necessity of successive levies from time to time whenever an installment of income might become due [rather than] to create a specific lien
upon income or earnings not yet due." 115 Furthermore, the language
upon which the "continuing levy" theory of Sims was based has been
removed from the statute. 116 Therefore, it is suggested that Judge
Friendly's reliance upon In re Sims is unjustified, particularly in view
117
of the considerable and well-reasoned authority to the contrary.
Finally, it is submitted that the Riddervold court failed to consider
Code section 547(e)(3). 11s A consideration of this section is necessary to
a satisfactory determination of whether payments made pursuant to an
income execution levy are properly recoverable as preferences. 119 As
the Cox court pointed out, the avoidance powers embodied in Code
section 547(b) extend to reach all transfers within the critical period,
regardless of when the lien or levy upon which the transfer is based was
created.1 20 While the Riddervold court avoided a direct reference to
the time of transfer in its opinion,' 21 it seems undeniable that, at some
point during the operation of the income execution against the debtor's
122
wages or future wages, a transfer must be deemed to have taken place.
on the question presented in Riddervold, Judge Knight, the author of Prunotto,
twice rejected the Sims' continuing levy theory and cited Beck on each occasion
to uphold the trustee's rights against the judgment creditor to wages of the
debtor withheld under an income execution during the initial period. See
In re Duffy, 34 F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); In re Smith, 8 F. Supp. 49
(W.D.N.Y. 1934).
113. See notes 42, 68 &c74 supra.
114. For a discussion of § 5231 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules and its predecessors, see note 49 supra.
115. Ulner v. Doran, 167 A.D. 259, 262, 152 N.Y.S. 655, 658 (1915).

See

note 67 supra.
116. See note 49 supra.
117. See, e.g., In re Cox, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 733 (D. Md. 1981);
In re Tamari, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Parten,
3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 402 (N.D Ala. 1977); In re Beck, 238 F. 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). See note 41 supra.
119. See, e.g., In re Cox, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 733 (D. Md. 1981).
For a discussion of Cox, see notes 70-76 and accompanying text supra.
120. See In re Cox, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 735. While state law
determines the character of liens in these circumstances, federal bankruptcy
law controls the determination of when a transfer takes place under an income
execution. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. III 1979). See also note 44 supra.
121. See note 105 supra.
122. It is submitted that the Riddervold court's assertion that payment to
the judgment creditor by the garnishee employer did not constitute a transfer
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Code section 547(e)(3) clearly states that a transfer is not made until the
debtor acquires rights in the property transferred. 12 3 Therefore, as the
court in Cox stated, "the transfer of wages garnished pursuant to a writ
of garnishment cannot occur until the judgment debtor has earned the
wages garnished." 124 Even if this proposition is simplistic, 125 it is submitted that the Riddervold court's highly technical holding that a novation occurs and that the debtor has no property interest in future wages
which are subject to an income execution is a strained analysis 126 for
of the debtor's property implies that the transfer occurred prior to the actual
payment. The Riddervold court suggests that the transfer of the debtor's
property was complete upon service of the income execution on the employer.
See 647 F.2d at 346. See also notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra.
If, in fact, the Riddervold court is suggesting that the debtor simply had no
property to transfer prior to the wages being earned, and that the income
execution effectively prevents the debtor from ever acquiring an interest in
his wages thereafter, the court failed to sufficiently justify this proposition.
See notes 125-26 infra.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
124. 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. at 735 (emphasis added). A number of courts
have followed essentially this same line of reasoning when applying § 547(e)(3)
to both wage garnishment payments and other analogous payments to a
judgment creditor during the ninety-day period. See note 74 supra.
The Riddervold court's analysis seems to equate the creation of the lien
and levy to a transfer of the property, or of an interest in property. Yet the
two are not functionally equivalent under bankruptcy law, and the clear
language of § 547(e)(3) seems to require a result contrary to that in Riddervold.
125. This assumes for purposes of analysis, that the court in Riddervold
simply argued that: 1) § 547 requires a transfer of the debtor's property; 2) by
virtue of the income execution served outside the ninety-day period, the
debtor never had or will have any interest in the portion of his wages at
issue, and therefore; 3) the inquiry simply never reaches § 547 because there
was no transfer of the property of the debtor. See notes 97-100 and accom.
panying text supra.
126. See In re Ransford, 194 F. 658 (6th Cir. 1912); note 46 supra. While
the Riddervold case can be distinguished from Ransford, the rationale behind
the Ransford decision seems applicable. If, as the Riddervold court suggests,
the income execution upon the debtor's wages operates as a novation, then,
by analogy to novation, the debtor is thereafter exonerated from liability to
the judgment creditor. See 194 F. at 633. The judgment creditor must look
to the garnishee alone for satisfaction of his debt. Id. If the garnishee should
thereafter fail to pay and, in fact, be unable to pay the judgment creditor, the
judgment creditor's debt would go unsatisfied, regardless of the means of the
original debtor. Id. It is submitted that this scenario creates an anomalous
result to which the Riddervold court would not subscribe.
In practice, as the Ransford court pointed out, the debtor is not absolved
of liability on the debt until the garnishee has satisfied his obligation to pay
the judgment creditor the amount due under the income execution. Id. at
662-63. In addition, the debtor has the right to satisfy the claim of the
judgment creditor prior to payment by the garnishee, in which case the judgment creditor's claim to the garnished fund is void, and the debtor's legal
right to the fund is unequivocal. Id. at 663.
With these considerations in mind, it is submitted that the debtor's property interest in wages earned subject to an income execution, continues until
such wages are actually paid to the judgment creditor. See id. Therefore, it
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127
Which too little justification has been offered.
. In considering the impact of Riddervold, it is submitted that judgment creditors within the Second Circuit's jurisdiction will make increasing use of income execution to secure payment of debts from
Wage-earning debtors. This will be felt primarily by wage-earners bordering on insolvency because their judgment creditors will no longer be
discouraged from seeking an income execution by the knowledge that
payments they receive immediately prior to the debtor's bankruptcy will
have to be returned to the debtor or his trustee in bankruptcy. Theoretically, the Riddervold decision could precipitate bankruptcy of marginally solvent wage-earning debtors by lessening the creditors' incentive
to cooperate with the debtor in arranging a workable repayment plan in
order to avoid bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the Riddervold analysis may be applied by the courts
in the Second Circuit to situations analogous to income execution to
prevent the operation of the preference section of the Code on transfers
of money or property received by a judgment creditor during the ninetyday period. It is submitted that the Riddervold court's analysis might
be applied to a debtor's assignment of future wages to a creditor, or to
any situation where a creditor acquires the right to a debtor's contingent
future interest in money or property. 128 In each of these situations
where the creditor receives the property during the ninety-day period,
it is submitted that, according to Riddervold, the Code's preference
section will not operate because the debtor could be said to have no
interest in the property transferred.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Riddervold analysis should
be rejected by courts presented with similar issues arising under other
state wage garnishment statutes. 1 9 Furthermore, while Riddervold
could be applied broadly to analogous situations, it is submitted that
the responses of the Cox court 130 and other courts to identical or similar

is submitted that the Riddervold court's total preclusion of the employee/
debtor's property interest in wages earned which are subject to an income
execution is not compelling.
127. In view of the novelty of the Riddervold court's conclusion on this
issue, it is submitted that some authority or a compelling rationale should
have been offered to support it.
128. See, e.g., In re Diversified World Investments, Ltd., 12 Bankr. 517
(S.D. Tex. 1981). Diversified involved a rent assignment to a creditor. There
is no reason that the Riddervold analysis could not be applied to the situation
posed in Diversified. For a discussion of Diversified, see note 74 supra.
129. Many state wage garnishment statutes include provisions similar to
those relied upon by the Riddervold court. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 723.020-.029 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361 (West Supp.
1981); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-601, 15-606 (West Supp. 1980); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§2A:17-50 to 17-56 (1952 & Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§8.01-511 to

516 (1977 &Supp. 1981).
130. See notes 70-76 supra.
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issues 131 are more appropriate in view of the clear language of Code
182
section 547(e)(3).
Thomas M. Binder

131. See note 74 supra.
132. See notes 41 & 115-20 and accompanying text supra.
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